Appeal No. 98-2118
Application No. 08/459,986
We are unpersuaded by the appellants' arguments. The
terminology in a pending application's claims is to be given
its broadest reasonable interpretation (In re Morris, 127 F.3d
1048, 1056, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1997) and In re
Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d, 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
1989)) and limitations from a pending application's
specification will not be read into the claims (Sjolund v.
Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1581-82, 6 USPQ2d 2020, 2027 (Fed.
Cir. 1989)). Moreover, anticipation by a prior art reference
does not require either the inventive concept of the claimed
subject matter or the recognition of inherent properties that
may be possessed by the prior art reference. See Verdegaal
Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 633, 2 USPQ2d
1051, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1987). A prior art reference
anticipates the subject matter of a claim when that reference
discloses every feature of the claimed invention, either
explicitly or inherently (see In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473,
1477, 44 USPQ2d 1429, 1431 (Fed. Cir. 1997) and Hazani v.
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 126 F.3d 1473, 1477, 44 USPQ2d 1358, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 1997)); however, the law of anticipation does not
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