Ex parte TREGILGAS - Page 10




              Appeal No. 1996-2086                                                                                        
              Application 08/255,588                                                                                      


              which he provides.  By reflecting on the breadth of the independent claims and the                          
              teachings of all the relevant prior art, we believe that the examiner will be in a better                   
              position to determine the patentability of the dependent claims.                                            
                                                 Response to Dissent                                                      
                     For the reasons set forth above, we disagree with the dissent that claim 1 is                        
              anticipated by the teachings of Fuller.  Thus, it follows that we do not agree that, without a              
              fact-based explanation from the examiner, said patent would have rendered the claimed                       
              subject matter obvious under the doctrine that anticipation is the epitome of obviousness.                  
              In re Skoner, 517, F.2d 947, 950, 186 USPQ 80, 83 (CCPA 1975); In re Pearson, 494                           

              F.2d 1399, 1402, 181 USPQ 641, 644 (CCPA 1974).                                                             
                     As pointed out in our Decision, we reversed the obviousness rejection due to the                     
              lack of any factual findings by the examiner with respect to independent claims 1, 8, and                   
              10, and not because of any deficiencies in the applied prior art.  In circumstances such as                 
              this, this Board has two options: (1) remand the case to the examiner to provide an                         
              explanation as to why the claimed invention would have been obvious to one of ordinary                      
              skill in the art in view of the applied prior art, or knowedge generally available in the art               
              (M.P.E.P. § 706.02(j)), or (2) make our own findings of fact and legal conclusions and,                     
              thus, set forth a new ground of rejection (37 C.F.R. § 1.196(b)).  We chose the former                      
              alternative.  In our view, the dissent has not affirmed the rejection set forth by the examiner.            


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