Ex Parte STAMLER et al - Page 7


                 Appeal No.  2000-0894                                                                                    
                 Application No.  08/437,884                                                                              

                         Since we conclude that the references do not support a prima facie case                          
                 under 35 U.S.C. § 103, we need not address Appellants’ evidence of unexpected                            
                 results.                                                                                                 
                 2.  The nonenablement rejection                                                                          
                         The examiner rejected claim 65 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph,                           
                 “because the specification, while being enabling for a method of treating                                
                 cardiovascular disorders with NO immunoglobulins, does not reasonably provide                            
                 enablement for preventing cardiovascular disorders with NO immunoglobulins.”                             
                 Examiner’s Answer, page 4 (emphasis added).  The examiner explains that “[t]he                           
                 specification fails to enable the ‘prevention’ of cardiovascular disorders. . . .                        
                 Prevention has been viewed as requiring the absolute and complete elimination                            
                 of any cardiovascular disorders and the specification fails to enable a claim of                         
                 that nature.”  Id., page 5.                                                                              
                         We begin our analysis with the examiner’s claim construction.  See In re                         
                 Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235, 169 USPQ 236, 238 (CCPA 1971) (“[W]hen the                                   
                 first paragraph [of 35 U.S.C. § 112] speaks of ‘the invention,’ it can only be                           
                 referring to that invention which the applicant wishes to have protected by the                          
                 patent grant, i.e., the claimed invention.  For this reason the claims must be                           
                 analyzed first in order to determine exactly what subject matter they                                    
                 encompass.”).  When construing claims during prosecution, “the PTO applies to                            
                 the verbiage of the proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the                               
                 words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary                             
                 skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions                       

                                                            7                                                             



Page:  Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  Next 

Last modified: November 3, 2007