Ex Parte CHI-YA CHENG et al - Page 3


               Appeal No. 2000-1007                                                                                                 
               Application 08/853,007                                                                                               

               way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the                     
               applicant’s specification.”); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir.                     
               1989) (“During patent examination the pending claims must be interpreted as broadly as their                         
               terms reasonably allow. When the applicant states the meaning that the claim terms are intended                      
               to have, the claims are examined with that meaning, in order to achieve a complete exploration                       
               of the applicant’s invention and its relation to the prior art. See In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393,                     
               1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA 1969) (before the application is granted, there is no                            
               reason to read into the claim the limitations of the specification.).”                                               
                       Thus, we interpret the claim term “binder-free” to permit the inclusion to some extent of                    
               “binder material such as clays or metal oxides, i.e., alumina or silica” which performs the                          
               function as a “binder” and does not form a part of the crystalline molecular sieve for another                       
               purpose.  With respect to the extent that binder material can be included, we point out that the                     
               term “substantially free” is a term of degree for which the written description in the specification                 
               must either provide a definition or some standard of measurement for the claim term that it                          
               modifies, or that term will be given its broadest reasonable ordinary meaning of from free to                        
               largely but not wholly free.  See Morris, supra; York Prods., Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm &                         
               Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1572-73, 40 USPQ2d 1619, 1622-23 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“In this case,                         
               the patent discloses no novel use of claim words. Ordinarily, therefore, ‘substantially’ means                       
               ‘considerable in . . . extent,’ American Heritage Dictionary Second College Edition 1213 (2d ed.                     
               1982), or ‘largely but not wholly that which is specified,’ Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate                           
               Dictionary 1176 (9th ed. 1983).”); Seattle Box Co., Inc. v. Industrial Crating & Packing Inc.,                       
               731 F.2d 818, 826, 221 USPQ 568, 573-74 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Definiteness problems arise when                          
               words of degree are used. That some claim language may not be precise, however, does not                             
               automatically render a claim invalid. When a word of degree is used . . . [it] must [be                              
               determined] whether the patent’s specification provides some standard for measuring that                             
               degree.”); In re Mattison, 509 F.2d 563, 564-65, 184 USPQ 484, 486 (CCPA 1975); cf. In re                            
               Marosi, 710 F.2d 799, 802-03, 218 USPQ 289, 292 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (the generally guidelines in                        
               appellants’ specification with respect to the term “essentially free of alkali metal” permitted a                    
               person of ordinary skill in the art to “draw the line between unavoidable impurities in starting                     
               materials and essential ingredients”).  We point out in this respect, it is appellants’ burden to                    

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