Appeal No. 2002-1477
Application No. 09/544,849
plus-function” language is not conclusive as to whether a claim
limitation will be interpreted as invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth
paragraph. See Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track and court
Construction, 172 F.3d 836, 850, 50 USPQ2d 1225, 1234 (Fed. Cir.
1999). Similarly, it has been held that the word “step” is not
necessary in setting forth a “step-plus-function” limitation. See
In re Roberts and Burch, 470 F.2d 1399, 1401, 176 USPQ 313, 315
(CCPA 1973).
We also find to be convincing Appellants’ arguments (Brief,
page 21) that the claim language “in a manner such that” is
equivalent to the language “so that” which the Federal Circuit has
construed as being equivalent to “means for” language. See
Greenburg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1584, 39
USPQ2d 1783, 1786-87 (Fed. Cir. 1996), citing Raytheon Co. v. Roper
Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 957, 220 USPQ 592, 597 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert
denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984). In view of the above discussion,
since we agree with Appellants that the claim language of
independent claim 17 properly invokes the provisions of the sixth
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, it is our view that the Examiner has
not established a prima facie case of anticipation. For all of the
reasons discussed supra with regard to independent claim 14, the
Examiner has not shown how the spring element 6 in Nishimura is
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