Ex Parte Rao - Page 5




          Appeal No. 2004-1235                                                        
          Application No. 09/845,643                                                  


               The appellant defines the size of his golf ball marker                 
          holder or the gap between their generally U-shape golf ball                 
          marker holder in terms of a function, i.e., capable of being                
          attached to a shoe, in claims 1, 13 and 17.  The appellant then             
          argues that the golf accessory caddy (10) described in Giglio is            
          not sized or shaped for attachment to a shoe.  We do not agree.             
               As stated in In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477, 44 USPQ2d           
          1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1997):                                                
                    A patent applicant is free to recite features of                  
               an apparatus either structurally or functionally.  See                 
               In re Swinehart, . . . 439 F.2d 210, 212, 169 USPQ 226,                
               228 (CCPA 1971)(“[T]here is nothing intrinsically wrong                
               with [defining something by what it does rather than                   
               what it is] in drafting patent claims.”).  Yet,                        
               choosing to define an element functionally, i.e., by                   
               what it does, carries with it a risk.  As our                          
               predecessor court stated in Swinehart, 439 F.2d at 213,                
               169 USPQ at 228:                                                       
                    where the Patent Office has reason to believe                     
                    that a functional limitation asserted to be                       
                    critical for establishing novelty in the                          
                    claimed subject matter may, in fact, be an                        
                    inherent characteristic of the prior art, it                      
                    possesses the authority to require the                            
                    applicant to prove that the subject matter                        
                    shown to be in the prior art does not possess                     
                    the characteristic relied on.  See also in re                     
                    Hallman, 655 F.2d 212, 215, 210 USPQ 609, 611                     
                    (CCPA 1981); In re Ludtke, . . . 441 F.2d                         
                    660, 663-64, 169 USPQ 563, 565-67 (CCPA                           
                    1971).                                                            




                                          5                                           





Page:  Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  Next 

Last modified: November 3, 2007