Ex Parte MCCARTHY - Page 4




             Appeal No. 2004-1920                                                          Page 4              
             Application No. 09/302,1999                                                                       


                                                      (1)                                                      
                   The first of the examiner’s rejections is that independent claims 1 and 13 and              
             dependent claims 6-12, 16, 17, 19 and 20 are unpatentable over Moeller in view of De              
             Rosa and Pesaturo.                                                                                
                   The examiner finds all of the subject matter recited in claim 1 to be disclosed or          
             taught by Moeller, except for using the impact tool to insert into or remove from the             
             ground a closed, pointed, hollow pole such as those used on beach umbrellas.                      
             However, the examiner has taken the position that it would have been obvious to so                
             utilize the Moeller impact device in view of the teachings of De Rosa and Pesaturo.  The          
             test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the prior art would have                   
             suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art.  See, for example, In re Keller, 642 F.2d          
             413, 425, 208 USPQ 871, 881 (CCPA 1981).  In establishing a prima facie case of                   
             obviousness, it is incumbent upon the examiner to provide a reason why one of ordinary            
             skill in the art would have been led to modify a prior art reference or to combine                
             reference teachings to arrive at the claimed invention.  See Ex parte Clapp, 227 USPQ             
             972, 973 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1985).  To this end, the requisite motivation must stem            
             from some teaching, suggestion or inference in the prior art as a whole or from the               
             knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art and not from the                
             appellant's disclosure.  See, for example, Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d         
             1044, 1052, 5 USPQ2d 1434, 1439 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988).                   








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