Ex Parte BARKER et al - Page 5




              Appeal No. 2004-2209                                                                       5               
              Application No. 09/406,445                                                                                 


              examiner states that this is a lack of enablement rejection.  See paragraph 2, page 2 of                   
              the Final Rejection, Paper No. 13.  And yet, in the next two paragraphs, the examiner                      
              twice states that the claims are unpatentable under the written description requirement                    
              of 35 U.S.C. § 112.  Finally, in the examiner’s answer at page 4, the examiner states                      
              that it would be almost impossible to determine whether one would infringe the claimed                     
              invention . . . .  This, of course, is an argument bottomed on 35 U.S.C. § 112, second                     
              paragraph, that the claims are so indefinite that an infringement analysis would be in                     
              doubt.                                                                                                     
                     Taking each in turn, and looking at enablement first, we note that the examiner                     
              has not addressed the issue of undue experimentation.  Accordingly, the examiner has                       
              not established a prima facie case of unpatentability with respect thereto.  If the                        
              examiner’s intention was to raise the issue of whether the scope of enablement was                         
              broad enough to include any non-metallic guide rail, we merely point out that it is well                   
              settled that if an invention pertains to an art where the results are predictable, e.g.,                   
              mechanical as opposed to chemical arts, a broad claim can be enabled by disclosure of                      
              a single embodiment, In re Cook , 439 F.2d 730, 735, 169 USPQ 298, 301 (CCPA                               
              1971); and such a claim is not invalid for lack of enablement simply because it reads on                   
              another embodiment of the invention which is inadequately disclosed, see Gould v.                          
              Mossinghoff , 711 F.2d 396, 400, 219 USPQ 393, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Spectra-Physics                       
              Inc. v. Coherent Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533, 3 USPQ2d 1737 (Fed. Cir. 1987).                                








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