Ex Parte Probster - Page 4


               Appeal No. 2004-2230                                                                                                   
               Application No. 09/742,269                                                                                             


                   I.      Whether the Rejections of Claims 1-4 and 6-7 Under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and                                     
                           Claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are proper?                                                                  
                       It is our view, after consideration of the record before us, that the disclosure of Grubb                      
               does fully meet the invention as recited in claims 1-4 and 6-7; and that the evidence relied upon                      
               and the level of skill in the particular art would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art                  
               the invention as set forth in claim 5.  Accordingly, we affirm.                                                        
                       It is axiomatic that anticipation of a claim under § 102 can be found only if the prior art                    
               reference discloses every element of the claim.  See In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1326, 231                              
               USPQ 136, 138 (Fed. Cir. 1986) and Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist                                    
               & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1458, 221 USPQ 481, 485 (Fed. Cir. 1984).                                                
                       With respect to independent claim 1, Appellant argues at pages 8-9 of the brief, “Grubb                        
               et al. do not mention anywhere the remote feeding of an optical amplifier” and “[t]he coupling                         
               device according to the invention of the instant application is remote from the pumping-light                          
               sources.”  We do not find these arguments persuasive.                                                                  
                       The preamble of Appellant’s claim 1 recites a “configuration for transmitting high-power                       
               pumping light for remotely feeding a fiber amplifier.”  We find that the limitation of “for                            
               remotely feeding” is an intended use limitation and does not recite any structural limitation                          
               beyond those found in the body of the claim.  If the body of a claim fully and intrinsically sets                      
               forth all of the limitations of the claimed invention, and the preamble merely states, for example,                    
               the purpose or intended use of the invention, rather than any distinct definition of any of the                        
               claimed invention’s limitations, then the preamble is not considered a limitation and is of no                         
               significance to claim construction. Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298,                          
               1305, 51 USPQ2d 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1999).                                                                           


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