Ex Parte Bumgarner et al - Page 3


               Appeal No. 2006-0235                                                                                               
               Application 09/733,352                                                                                             

               Knowles alone and as combined with Bice,4 as applied by the examiner, to one of ordinary skill                     
               in this art at the time the claimed invention was made.  Accordingly, since a prima facie case of                  
               obviousness has been established by the examiner, we again evaluate all of the evidence of                         
               obviousness and nonobviousness based on the record as a whole, giving due consideration to the                     
               weight of appellants’ arguments in the brief and reply brief.  See generally, In re Oetiker,                       
               977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468,                         
               1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984).                                                                          
                      In order to review the examiner’s application of prior art to the appealed claims, we first                 
               interpret independent claim 1, representative of the claims, by giving the terms thereof the                       
               broadest reasonable interpretation in their ordinary usage in context as they would be understood                  
               by one of ordinary skill in the art in light of the written description in the specification, including            
               the drawings, unless another meaning is intended by appellants as established in the written                       
               description of the specification, and without reading into the claims any limitation or particular                 
               embodiment disclosed in the specification.  See, e.g., In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d                
               1359, 1364, 70 USPQ2d 1827, 1830 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054-55,                           
               44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22, 13 USPQ2d 1320,                          
               1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  As illustrated by specification Figs. 1 and 2, the plain language of claim                 
               1 specifies a method of screening an optical fiber during a fiber draw process, comprising at least                
               the steps of pulling any length, however small, of any manner of optical fiber 8 from any manner                   
               of source of optical fiber perform, not illustrated, imparting any amount of tensile stress to fiber               
               8 to thereby test the strength thereof, and at any subsequent point in the process of                              
               manufacturing fiber 8, winding the fiber in any manner onto any manner of spool, e.g., 15.  The                    
               tensile strength is imparted to optical fiber 8 via any manner of first and second capstans 20,24                  
               and the tensile strength is monitored in any manner involving any manner of load cell, not                         
               illustrated, with any manner of feedback from the load cell processed in any manner and used to                    
               adjust the speed to any extent, however small, of either of the capstans 20,24 to maintain the                     
               desired tensile                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                 
               4  A discussion of Keck and Halliday is not necessary to our decision with respect to either                       
               ground of rejection. See In re Kronig, 539 F.2d 1300, 1302-04, 190 USPQ 425, 426-28 (CCPA                          
               1976).                                                                                                             

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