Ex Parte Rasmussen - Page 5




               Appeal No. 2006-1277                                                                       Page 5                
               Application No. 10/221,711                                                                                       


                      While it is true that the claims in a patent application are to be given their broadest                   
               reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification during prosecution of a patent                       
               application (see, for example, In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir.                   
               1989)), it is also well settled that terms in a claim should be construed as those skilled in the art            
               would construe them (see Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 986, 6 USPQ2d                        
               1601, 1604 (Fed. Cir. 1988) and In re Johnson, 558 F.2d 1008, 1016, 194 USPQ 187, 194                            
               (CCPA 1977).  Further, as pointed out by our reviewing court in Phillipps v. AWH Corp., 415                      
               F.3d 1303, 1315, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the claims, of course, do not stand                      
               alone but, rather, are part of a fully integrated written instrument consisting principally of a                 
               specification that concludes with the claims.  For that reason, claims must be read in view of the               
               specification, of which they are a part.  "[T]he specification is always highly relevant to the                  
               claim construction analysis.  Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning             
               of a disputed term."  Id.                                                                                        
                      We agree with the appellant in this case that the examiner’s interpretation of the term                   
               “cam” in claim 1 as requiring simply a “machine part that transfers motion” is not well founded.                 
               Even if the examiner is correct that the MSN Encarta Dictionary intends the bold texting as the                  
               primary, broad definition and the text following the bold texting as a further qualification which               
               is a secondary definition of the previous description of “cam,” such primary, broad definition is                
               not the broadest reasonable interpretation of “cam” within the context of appellant’s invention.                 
               We agree with the appellant that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not consider a torsion              
               spring to be a cam, especially when read in light of appellant’s specification, which describes a                
               cam arrangement of the cam surfaces 8a of the spindle 8 and the cam followers 9a of the buttons                  
               9 between the spindle 8 and buttons 9 (specification, p. 9 and Figure 8).  Rather, such a person                 
               would understand a “cam” to be an element that imparts reciprocating linear motion to another                    
               element pressing against it, by sliding or rolling contact.  Consequently, the rejection of                      









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