Ex Parte Welty et al - Page 4


               Appeal No. 2006-2660                                                                                                  
               Application 10/007,021                                                                                                

               of’ for purposes of its patent by making clear in its specification what it regarded as constituting                  
               a material change in the basic and novel characteristics of the invention. The question for our                       
               decision is whether PPG did so.”); In re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 551-52, 190 USPQ 461, 463                                
               (CCPA 1976) (“[I]t is necessary and proper to determine whether [the] specification reasonably                        
               supports a construction” that would exclude or include particular ingredients.).  The transitional                    
               term “comprising” opens claim 32 to encompass articles containing additional layers, such as                          
               between the substrate and the nickel layer, and several different nickel layers based on brightener                   
               additives.  See generally, Exxon Chem. Pats., Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1555,                             
               35 USPQ2d 1801, 1802 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The claimed composition is defined as comprising -                            
               meaning containing at least - five specific ingredients.”); In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 686-87,                       
               210 USPQ 795, 802-03 (CCPA 1981) (“As long as one of the monomers in the reaction is                                  
               propylene, any other monomer may be present, because the term ‘comprises’ permits the                                 
               inclusion of other steps, elements, or materials.”).                                                                  
                       It is well settled that the examiner has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of                     
               anticipation under § 102(e) in the first instance by pointing out where each and every element of                     
               the claimed invention, arranged as required by the claim, is described identically in a single                        
               reference, either expressly or under the principles of inherency, in a manner sufficient to have                      
               placed a person of ordinary skill in the art in possession thereof.  See generally, Spada, 911 F.2d                   
               at 708, 15 USPQ2d at 1657.  It is further well settled that if a reference does not disclose a                        
               specific embodiment which satisfies all of the claim limitations, the reference will nonetheless                      
               describe the claimed invention within the meaning of § 102 if it “clearly and unequivocally . . .                     
               [directs] those skilled in the art to [the claimed invention] without any need for picking,                           
               choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the teachings                       
               of the cited reference.”  In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 587, 172 USPQ 524, 526 (CCPA 1972).                             
               Whether a reference provides clear and unequivocal direction to the claimed invention is                              
               determined on the total circumstances with respect to the disclosure of the reference, see In re                      
               Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 682, 133 USPQ 275, 280 (CCPA 1962), including “not only specific                              
               teachings of the reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably                      
               be expected to draw therefrom.”  In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826, 159 USPQ 342, 344 (CCPA                              
               1968); see also In re Graves, 69 F.3d 1147, 1152, 36 USPQ2d 1697, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1995), and                          

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