Ex Parte Longnecker et al - Page 7


                Appeal No. 2006-3076                                                        Page 7                 
                Application No. 10/004,948                                                                         

                USPQ2d 1596, 1598 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  Rejections based on § 103 must rest on a factual              
                basis with these facts being interpreted without hindsight reconstruction of the invention         
                from the prior art.  The Examiner may not, because of doubt that the invention is                  
                patentable, resort to speculation, unfounded assumption or hindsight reconstruction to             
                supply deficiencies in the factual basis for the rejection.  See In re Warner, 379 F.2d            
                1011, 1017, 154 USPQ 173, 177 (CCPA 1967).  Our reviewing court has repeatedly                     
                cautioned against employing hindsight by using the appellant's disclosure as a blueprint           
                to reconstruct the claimed invention from the isolated teachings of the prior art.  See, e.g.,     
                Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 907, 5 USPQ2d                   
                1788, 1792 (Fed. Cir. 1988).                                                                       
                       When determining obviousness, “the [E]xaminer can satisfy the burden of                     
                showing obviousness of the combination ‘only by showing some objective teaching in the             
                prior art or that knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art would          
                lead that individual to combine the relevant teachings of the references.’”  In re  Lee, 277       
                F.3d 1338, 1343, 61 USPQ2d 1430, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 2002), citing In re Fritch, 972 F.2d              
                1260, 1265, 23 USPQ2d 1780, 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  “Broad conclusory statements                   
                regarding the teaching of multiple references, standing alone, are not ‘evidence.’”  In re         
                Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999, 50 USPQ2d 1614, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 1999). “Mere denials                 
                and conclusory statements, however, are not sufficient to establish a genuine issue of             
                material fact.”  Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 999-1000, 50 USPQ2d at 1617, citing                        
                McElmurry v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 995 F.2d 1576, 1578, 27 USPQ2d 1129,                      
                1131 (Fed. Cir. 1993).                                                                             
                       Further, as pointed out by our reviewing court, we must first determine the scope           
                of the claim.  “[T]he name of the game is the claim.”  In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362,           
                1369, 47 USPQ2d 1523, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  Therefore, we look to the limitations as             
                recited in independent claim 1.  With respect to independent claim 1, Appellants argue             
                that O’Sullivan did not meet three of the steps of the claimed limitations and that                
                Flansburg “does not show how information regarding the requirements for a computer                 
                network is gathered or how the information to produce a drawing of the proposed                    
                computer network is collected and sent to the drawing program” (Brief, p. 15).  We                 






Page:  Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  Next 

Last modified: November 3, 2007