Appeal 2007-0987
Application 09/810,992
database to retrieve personalized content identified by the personalization
engine, as set forth in independent claims 1 and 8, is also suggested by item
4 of Forecast Pro which describes the output of the selected forecasting
technique, i.e., personalization engine, to provide database access.
In view of the above discussion and analysis of the disclosure of the
Forecast Pro reference, it is our opinion that, although we found no error in
the Examiner’s proposed combination of Kadowaki and Forecast Pro, as
discussed supra, the Kadowaki reference is not necessary for a proper
rejection of at least independent claims 1 and 8 since all of the claimed
elements are in fact present in the disclosure of Forecast Pro. A disclosure
that anticipates under 35 U.S.C. § 102 also renders the claim unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103, for "anticipation is the epitome of obviousness."
Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1529, 220 USPQ 1021, 1025 (Fed. Cir.
1984). See also In re Fracalossi, 681 F.2d 792, 794, 215 USPQ 569, 571
(CCPA 1982); In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1402, 181 USPQ 641, 644
(CCPA 1974).
For the above reasons, since it is our opinion that the Examiner’s
prima facie case of obviousness has not been overcome by any convincing
arguments from Appellants, the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of
claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, and 12-17, is sustained.
We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent
claims 3, 5, 10, and 11, in which the Kurtzman, II reference is added to the
combination of Kadowaki and Forecast Pro, as well as the rejection of
dependent claim 7, in which the Jacobi and Tetzlaff references are added to
Kadowaki and Forecast Pro. Appellants have provided no separate
arguments relative to the patentability of these claims but, rather, have
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