Ex Parte McCullough - Page 8

               Appeal 2007-3874                                                                            
               Application 10/288,027                                                                      

               54 USPQ2d 1664, 1666-67 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048,                      
               1054-55, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319,                  
               321-22, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989).                                              
                      Thus, with respect to the second issue, even if one of ordinary skill in             
               the art would have substituted Unger’s carbon-carbon matrix material 4, 6                   
               for Mahulikar’s heat spreader 76 as encapsulated within plastic housing 62                  
               as disclosed by the latter with respect to Fig. 5, the result is not an                     
               embodiment that falls within the claims.  Indeed, we cannot agree with the                  
               Examiner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found in Mahulikar                
               any teachings of inference2 suggesting that the part of plastic housing 62                  
               below bonding plate 66 constitutes a separate heat sink.  Furthermore, as                   
               Appellant points out, there is no disclosure in Unger which would have                      
               suggested encapsulating the single one-piece unit of heat sink 4 and heat                   
               transfer plate 6, which has conductive fin structures, in a thermally                       
               conductive filler containing thermoplastic material.  Thus, the combined                    
               teachings of Mahulikar and Unger would not result in the basic structure of                 
               the claimed heat sink encompassed by the claims.                                            
                      Accordingly, on this record, the Examiner has not established a prima                
               facie case of obviousness, and therefore, we reverse the ground of rejection                
               under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).                                                                   
                                                                                                          
               2  It is well settled that a reference stands for all of the specific teachings             
               thereof as well as the inferences one of ordinary skill in this art would have              
               reasonably been expected to draw therefrom, see In re Fritch, 972 F.2d                      
               1260, 1264-65, 23 USPQ2d 1780, 1782-83 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Preda,                       
               401 F.2d 825, 826, 159 USPQ 342, 344 (CCPA 1968), presuming skill on                        
               the part of this person.  In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 743, 226 USPQ 771, 774                
               (Fed. Cir. 1985).                                                                           
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