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prevent us from applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel.
Accordingly, we hold that respondent is judicially estopped from
claiming that the payments to Mr. Maynard were not fees for his
consulting services. It follows that petitioner is entitled to a
deduction for the $52,999.50.
Petitioner claimed a deduction in the amount of $256.16 for
expenses incurred in moving Renata's possessions from New Mexico to
California. Petitioner also claimed a deduction in the amount of
$248 for an airline ticket to Albuquerque, New Mexico, so that she
could assist in moving Renata and Renata's daughter. In addition,
petitioner claimed a deduction in the amount of $48.83 for a room
at the Geronimo Motel in Flagstaff, Arizona, where the three of
them stayed on their way to California. Renata had wanted to
return to California, but had no money. Petitioner wanted Renata
to work for her, and after moving to California in 1989, Renata
went to work for petitioner's business as a translator and a job
developer.
In general, where an expenditure is primarily associated with
business purposes, and personal benefit is distinctly secondary and
incidental, the expenditure may be deducted under section 162.
International Artists, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 94, 104
(1970); Sanitary Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 463,
467-468 (1955). Conversely, if an expenditure is primarily
motivated by personal considerations, no deduction will be allowed.
Henry v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 879, 884 (1961); Larrabee v.
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