- 5 -
The parties focus on petitioner's employment relationship
with the State of Nebraska, and we do likewise. Petitioners
apparently agree that the fund constitutes a pension plan within
the meaning of section 219(g), and to the extent that petitioner
was an employee of State of Nebraska, he was an active
participant in that plan.
Although the term "employee" is defined for other purposes
throughout the Internal Revenue Code, see e.g., section 3401(c),
Congress did not provide a statutory definition for purposes of
section 219. However, this Court and the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, where appeal lies in this case, focused
precisely on this point in Porter v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 548
(1987), revd. 856 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1988), affd. on other
grounds sub nom. Adams v. Commissioner, 841 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.
1988).
In Porter v. Commissioner, supra, we considered whether for
purposes of section 219(g), Federal judges appointed under
Article III of the United States Constitution (Federal judges)
were employees of the United States. Acknowledging that Congress
used the term "employee" in different ways throughout the
Internal Revenue Code, we decided that for purposes of that
section Congress intended the common-law definition of the term
to apply. Id. at 553-554. After reviewing the authority and
function of Federal judges and the relevant common-law principles
typically considered in resolving issues relating to the
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011