John M. and Rita K. Monahan - Page 12

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               Respondent directs our attention to this Court's holding in            
          Monahan I that interest income earned by Aldergrove on certified            
          deposit accounts in 1985 constituted income to petitioners.  It             
          is unclear whether respondent believes that that determination is           
          dispositive of the 1991 interest issue.  We believe, however,               
          that our holding in Monahan I with respect to the 1985 interest             
          income does not preclude petitioners from litigating the 1991               
          interest issue.  The doctrine of issue preclusion must be applied           
          carefully so that fairness to litigants is not compromised for              
          efficiency and economy.3  Some courts have advised narrow                   
          application of the doctrine in the context of tax litigation.               
          See, e.g., Kennedy v. Commissioner, 876 F.2d 1251, 1257 (6th Cir.           
          1989), affg. Gray v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1306 (1987); 18 Moore,           
          Moore's Federal Practice, par. 132.02, at 132-38 (3d ed. 1997).             
          That approach appears to be a product of the “separable facts”              
          doctrine, first enunciated in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.              
          591, 601 (1948).  Although it is unclear whether the separable              

          2(...continued)                                                             
          preclusion (or collateral estoppel), that bar, respectively, a              
          subsequent action or the subsequent litigation of a particular              
          issue because of the adjudication of a prior action.” (fn. ref.             
          omitted)).                                                                  
          3    See United States v. Silliman, 167 F.2d 607, 614 (3d Cir.              
          1948) (“Such a rule of public policy [collateral estoppel] must             
          be watched in its application lest a blind adherence to it tend             
          to defeat the even firmer established policy of giving every                
          litigant a full and fair day in court.”).                                   






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