Sprint Corporation and Subsidiaries, f.k.a. United Telecommunications, Inc. - Page 37

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          such a broad construction for purposes of the ITC, I similarly              
          disagree with its extension to ACRS.                                        
               1.  Absence of Intellectual Property Rights                            
               The second basis of the Norwest majority's holding is that             
          no copyright rights were passed to Norwest (or Sprint).  In                 
          Norwest the Court failed to offer any analysis or cite any cases            
          which indicate why the presence or absence of such rights should            
          control the character of the tangible medium which, as the                  
          majority itself points out, is distinct and separate property               
          from the copyright rights.  Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, supra            
          at __ (slip op. at 27).  The notion that copyright rights are               
          separate and independent from a tangible embodiment is well                 
          supported.  In Rev. Rul. 80-327, 1980-2 C.B. 23, the rights to              
          manufacture and distribute books were acquired with the plates              
          used in the printing of the books.  The Service analyzed the two            
          types of property separately and ruled that the plates were                 
          tangible, while the distribution rights were intangible.  There             
          simply is no rational basis to conclude that the presence or                
          absence of one separate and distinct property interest, the                 
          intangible copyright right, should control the character of other           
          separate and independent property.                                          
               Furthermore, this approach ignores the fact that the                   
          computer source code, which is intellectual property, is property           
          separate and distinct from the copyright rights and the tangible            
          medium.  As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit indicated            
          in Comshare, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1142, 1145 (6th Cir.            



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