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Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 758 (1961).
However, when two statutes are capable of coexistence, "it is the
duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional
intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective." Vimar
Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 533
(1995); see DeSalvo v. IRS, 861 F.2d 1217, 1219 (10th Cir. 1988).
Petitioner points to section 469(b), (f)(2), and (g)(1) to
sustain this position. Petitioner argues that the clause "Except
as otherwise provided in this section" (emphasis added) in
section 469(b) dictates the conclusion that section 1371(b)(1),
not being in section 469, does not apply to PAL's and, therefore,
St. Charles should be allowed to use the suspended PAL's.
As previously noted, see supra pp. 4-5, section 469(b)
provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this section, any
loss or credit from an activity which is disallowed under
subsection (a) shall be treated as a deduction or credit
allocable to such activity in the next taxable year."
Section 469(b) accomplishes two things: (1) It maintains
the deductibility of suspended PAL's activity by activity,
important to the overall working of section 469, and (2) it
allows the taxpayer further opportunity to take such a loss.
Even without the interplay of section 1371(b)(1), section 469(b)
does not mean the taxpayer must recognize the loss in the
immediately following year; the taxpayer may not have sufficient
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