Louis Stein and Estate of Yvonne Stein - Page 4




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               Petitioners seek reimbursement for attorney’s fees at hourly           
          rates of $275 and $280, relating to 1997 and 1998, respectively.            
          Respondent contends these rates are unreasonable.                           
               Section 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii) imposes a statutory rate for                
          attorney’s fees (i.e., $110 and $120 per hour, relating to 1997             
          and 1998, respectively).  See Rev. Proc. 96-59, 1996-2 C.B. 392,            
          396; Rev. Proc. 97-57, 1997-2 C.B. 584, 587.  Petitioners may               
          receive fees in excess of the statutory rate if the Court                   
          determines that “a special factor, such as the limited                      
          availability of qualified attorneys for such proceeding,                    
          justifies a higher rate.”  Sec. 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii).  The Court              
          has explained:                                                              
               in order for the “limited availability of qualified                    
               attorneys” to constitute a special factor warranting                   
               departure from the [statutory] cap, there must be a limited            
               availability of attorneys who possess distinctive knowledge            
               or a specialized skill needful to the particular litigation            
               in question * * *.                                                     
          Cozean v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 227, 232 (1997) (citing Pierce             
          v. Underwood, supra at 572); cf. Powers v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.           
          457, 489 (1993) (stating that there was no special factor where             
          the case “did not require a distinctive knowledge or specialized            
          skill within the general field of taxation.”), affd. in part,               
          revd. in part, and remanded on another ground 43 F.3d 172 (5th              
          Cir. 1995).                                                                 









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