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Discussion
A. Capital Gain on Sale of the Danville Property
Petitioners argue there was no sale of the Danville property
in 1992, and therefore their taxable income for 1992 includes no
capital gain on the property.3 The burden of proof is on
petitioners. See Rule 142(a).
For Federal tax purposes, a sale of real property is
generally considered to occur at the earlier of the transfer of
legal title or the practical assumption of the benefits and
burdens of ownership. See Derr v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 708, 723
(1981); Baird v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 115, 124 (1977).
Petitioners conveyed legal title to Haq by grant deed dated April
29, 1992, and executed by petitioners April 30, 1992; the grant
deed was recorded on June 17, 1992.
Petitioners contend that their signatures on the grant deed,
as well as the assignment of deed of trust, were forged. The
only evidence offered in support of petitioners’ forgery theory
was petitioner husband’s testimony, which is unsubstantiated and
unconvincing.4 We are not required to accept such testimony, and
we decline to do so. See Cluck v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 324,
338 (1995). Petitioner wife did not testify. Petitioners failed
3 Petitioners do not contend that any sale of the Danville
property would qualify for nonrecognition treatment under sec.
1034.
4 While maintaining that he could not recall if he signed
the grant deed, petitioner husband conceded at trial that the
signature on it “looks like my signature”.
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