- 21 -
We have focused on the language of the statutes in light of
the legislative history of the later-enacted provisions of
section 183(e), and we discern a congressional purpose that the
refund statute of limitations provisions be interpreted in light
of section 183(e). The matter before us, then, is how to
harmonize sections 183(e) and 6501. In doing so we have
interpreted the statutory language in light of the Congress’
instructions as to what this language was intended to, and
expected to, accomplish.
Our analysis is consistent with the analysis set forth in
Crawford v. Commissioner, supra. Instead of limiting ourselves
to the text of section 6501(a), which provides that "Except as
otherwise provided in this section," the 3-year assessment period
is applicable, we examined the legislative history of section 183
and concluded that "a sensible construction of section 183(e)(4)
is that it modifies section 6501(a) with regard to a section 183
activity for which an election under section 183(e)(1) has been
made." Crawford v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. at 307. We reached
this conclusion in Crawford notwithstanding the absence in the
section 183 legislative history of any discussion about section
6501(c)(4) agreements’ being entered into at any time after the
expiration of the assessment period actually prescribed in
section 6501. If our harmonizing of sections 183(e)(4) and 6501
was permissible in Crawford--and we believe it was--then a
Page: Previous 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011