Thomas D. Berry - Page 9




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            of attorney’s fees.  Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court                            
            of Oklahoma held that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter                            
            an order awarding attorney’s fees to the legal representative of                           
            the deceased wife.  For a similar holding, see Swick v. Swick,                             
            864 P.2d 819 (Okla. 1993) (where a spouse in a divorce proceeding                          
            died after the entry of a final divorce decree, but before the                             
            court decided the deceased spouse’s motion for attorney’s fees,                            
            the deceased spouse’s attorney had standing to move for the                                
            payment of his client’s attorney’s fees).                                                  
                  The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has recognized that an                                 
            attorney’s standing to seek the payment of attorney’s fees in a                            
            divorce action is not always contingent on the trial court’s                               
            continuing jurisdiction over the divorce proceeding.  In Kelly v.                          
            Maupin, 58 P.2d 116 (Okla. 1936), a case somewhat analogous to                             
            the instant case, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that, where                           
            a trial court had entered a temporary order awarding attorney’s                            
            fees to a wife in a divorce proceeding, the wife’s attorney had                            
            the right to enforce that order through contempt proceedings                               
            brought against the husband, even though the wife had filed a                              
            dismissal with respect to her divorce petition in the interim.                             
            The court held in pertinent part:                                                          
                  We do not think it is essential to a determination of                                
                  this case to decide definitely whether this order was                                
                  effective as a dismissal of the divorce action.                                      
                  Regardless of its effect in that particular, it was, in                              
                  our judgment, obviously ineffective to destroy the                                   
                  previous order made by the court, in so far as that                                  





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