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Commissioner, 66 T.C. 312, 318 (1976). Insofar as Hermine’s
stipulation may be interpreted as expressing a conclusion
regarding the application of law to fact-–that is, the conclusion
that all the stipulated payments were made “on her behalf” for
purposes of the legal requirement of section 71(b)(1)(A)-–we
disregard it because the undisputed facts in this case contradict
such a conclusion.
In the instant case, Harvey’s payments stipulated as “on
Hermine’s behalf” covered both his own housing expenses as well
as those of Hermine. It is Harvey’s position that the entire
amount of the expenses he paid with respect to the marital home
and apartment are deductible as alimony, notwithstanding that he
occupied each of those properties for approximately the same
number of months that Hermine did during the period in issue.
What Harvey’s argument overlooks is that the separation agreement
we have found within the June 1 letters both delineated an
obligation for Harvey (payment of the expenses associated with
the marital home and apartment) and secured for him a valuable
right (sole occupancy for 6 months annually of each residence).
Insofar as Harvey’s payments secured for him a right of occupancy
and defrayed the costs of his occupancy, we conclude that they
were not made “on behalf of” Hermine within the meaning of
section 71(b)(1)(A). They are instead merely “personal” or
“living” expenses, nondeductible under section 262(a). Cf.
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