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“reiterate[d] and reaffirm[ed] each and every statement of Claim,
Fact, Law, Case Law, and Regulation contained in the original
PETITION,” and he contended that his arguments and statements of
fact/law were entitled to a presumption of correctness.
On February 10, 1999, a hearing was held on the motion to
dismiss. Pursuant to the hearing and by an order dated February
18, 1999, this Court denied the motion to dismiss. The Court
struck the amended petition in its entirety and struck all
statements and allegations set forth in the petition except for
paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 19. The stricken portions contained tax-
protester rhetoric. Taking into account the nonstricken portions
of the petition, only one issue remained–-whether petitioner had
any long-term capital gains in 1994.
At the hearing, petitioner was warned that if he continued
at trial to advance tax-protester arguments this Court would
impose a penalty under section 6673 for a sum substantially
higher than the $1,000 penalty we awarded against petitioner in
McQuatters v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-88 (McQuatters I).3
On May 11, 1999, and June 3, 1999, respectively, petitioner
served a request for admissions and written interrogatories on
respondent. Petitioner’s requests related to his arguments that
3 Petitioner was before this Court with regard to his 1988
taxable year in McQuatters I. In McQuatters I, petitioner
asserted typical tax-protester arguments, and this Court
penalized him $1,000 pursuant to sec. 6673.
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