- 15 -
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary
in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute. [Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., supra at 842-843; fn. refs. omitted.]
A challenged regulation is not considered such a permissible
construction or reasonable interpretation unless it harmonizes
both with the statutory language and with the statute’s origin
and purpose. See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., supra at
25-26; National Muffler Dealers Association v. United States, 440
U.S. 472, 477 (1979) (National Muffler).
We pause to note that before the Chevron standard of review
was enunciated by the Supreme Court, the traditional standard was
simply “whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain language
of the statute, its origin, and its purpose”, as prescribed by
the Supreme Court in National Muffler Dealers Association v.
United States, supra at 477. As we have observed in a previous
case, the opinion of the Supreme Court in Chevron failed to cite
National Muffler and may have established a different formulation
of the standard of review. See Central Pa. Sav. Association v.
Commissioner, 104 T.C. 384, 390-391 (1995). In the case before
us, we conclude that it is unnecessary to parse the semantics of
the two tests to discern any substantive difference between them,
because the result here would be the same under either.
Page: Previous 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011