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existed a 57-percent complete residence with no enforceable right
to insurance reimbursement and no contractual obligation between
the estate or heirs and Krueger for the completion of
construction. Under these circumstances no amount was includable
in decedent’s gross estate to represent any possible future
payment from Chubb.
The situation here is unlike those where services have been
performed and/or an asset exchanged and something was due to or
from decedent at the time of death. See, e.g., Estate of Curry
v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 540, 545-547 (1980), where a contingent
legal fee was includable in an estate based on the rationale that
it had been earned and a claim existed at the time of death.
Chubb’s obligation to pay is conditional and did not arise
or exist until after decedent’s death. Stated another way,
decedent did not have a right, at the time of her death, to
receive reimbursement from Chubb until and unless the restoration
was accomplished triggering Chubb’s obligation. See also Estate
of Rowan v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 633, 640 (1970), where crops
had been produced, sold, and delivered prior to death so that
there was a right to receive payment that was includable in that
estate.
Another significant reason for our holding is that the
reimbursement payments, if made, had no rational relationship to
the value of the completed residence or asset. Any such payments
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