-12- importantly, the facts and circumstances in the record in this case do not support petitioner’s claim. First, the language is not supported by the evidence in our record. We know that all proceeds were not paid on account of personal injury. Plaintiffs, in their memorandum in support of the motion for judicial approval, allocated all settlement proceeds according to back wages, attorney’s fees, and lawsuit involvement. We find it significant that there was no allocation for personal injury when the parties to the class action meticulously provided for all of the items involved in the FLSA claim. Petitioner dismisses this as a mere technicality. We cannot so easily ignore this aspect-–especially in light of the fact that petitioner admits on brief that up to 50 percent of the proceeds could have been received on account of the FLSA claim. Second, this language does not show a direct link between the tort claim and a specific amount of money. It is well settled that “Failure to show the specific amount of the payment allocable to the claims of tort or tortlike damages for personal injuries results in the entire amount’s being presumed not to be excludable.” Wise v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-4; see also Jacobs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-59. Considering that exclusions from income (including those in section 104(a)(2)) are narrowly construed, we cannot accept petitioner’s contentions on this record that the uncorroborated and equivocal statements in the agreement and release arePage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Next
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