- 10 - 235, 242 (1989); Ewing v. Commissioner, supra at 503. If the statute is silent or ambiguous, then we may look to the legislative history to determine congressional intent. Burlington N. R.R. v. Okla. Tax Commn., 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987); Fernandez v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 324, 329-330 (2000). The legislative history of a statute is secondary when we can apply the plain meaning of unambiguous text; however, unequivocal evidence of clear legislative intent may sometimes override a plain meaning interpretation and lead to a different result. Allen v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 1, 17 (2002) (and cases cited thereat); Nordtvedt v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 165, 169 (2001), affd. without published opinion 22 Fed. Appx. 790 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 152(e)(1) provides that the special support test applies to “parents” in three different situations. The statute specifically provides that the test applies not only to divorced and certain separated parents, but to parents “who live apart at all times during the last 6 months of the calendar year”. There is no requirement in the statute that parents have married each other before the special support test can apply. Section 152(e)(1) applies to any parents, regardless of marital status, as long as they lived apart at all times for at least the last 6 months of the calendar year. Respondent contends that the legislative history of section 152(e) supports the interpretation that section 152(e)(1)(A)(iii)Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011