- 29 -
embedded in the statute, in the sense of being most harmonious
with its scheme and with the general purposes that Congress
manifested, see NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., supra at 297.13
Taken as a whole, the history of the fishing industry, the
legislative history underlying section 3121(b)(20), the preamble
to and the example in the regulation, and a logical and practical
interpretation of the statute suggest that Congress, in enacting
section 3121(b)(20), intended that proceeds after subtraction of
operating expenses depend on the amount of the catch. We do not
interpret the “depends solely” provision of section
31.3121(b)(20)-1, Employment Tax Regs., as precluding subtraction
of operating expenses from proceeds.
For several centuries, fishing boat crew members working
under the “lay” system have, for the most part, received a share
of profits from the sale of the catch, or excess of revenues over
expenses, which is synonymous with “net proceeds”, rather than a
13Where the statutory language appears clear, we would
require unequivocal evidence of legislative purpose before
construing the statute so as to override the plain meaning of the
words used therein, see United States v. Am. Trucking
Associations, 310 U.S. 534, 543-544 (1940); Huntsberry v.
Commissioner, 83 T.C. 742, 747-748 (1984), particularly where we
have a complex set of statutory provisions marked by a high
degree of specificity, see Huntsberry v. Commissioner, supra at
748; cf. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl.
334, 685 F.2d 1346, 1348 (1982). The statutory language of sec.
3121(b)(20) and the regulation is not clear. Sec. 3121(b)(20) is
not a statute with a complex set of provisions marked by a high
degree of specificity. Even if the statute were clear, the
legislative history does not necessarily provide unequivocal
evidence of legislative purpose.
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