William J. Cutts - Page 26

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          Timberlake, 74 Ala. 259, 264 (1883), a case between individuals,            
          for the general proposition that “When parties have cross-demands           
          against each other, the real indebtedness is the excess of one              
          debt over the other.”  This rule of setoff is most often applied            
          in the bank/depositor context to hold that the bank is entitled,            
          when its loan to the depositor matures, to apply the amount in              
          the depositor’s bank account to the bank’s loan to the depositor.           
          In re Patterson, 967 F.2d 505 (11th Cir. 1992) (applying Alabama            
          law); Rainsville Bank v. Willingham, 485 So. 2d 319 (Ala. 1986);            
          Norris v. Commercial Natl. Bank, supra.                                     
               For the setoff to be valid, the cross-demands must be                  
          mutual; that is, “due from one party to the other in the same               
          right.”  In re Patterson, supra at 510; Atkinson v. Fed. Deposit            
          Ins. Corp., 635 F.2d 508, 510-511 (5th Cir. 1981); King v.                  
          Porter, 160 So. 101, 104 (Ala. 1935).  Whether the cross-demands            
          are mutual is an issue of Alabama local law, which requires that            
          the cross-demands are mature at the time of setoff and are                  
          between parties of like capacity.  In re Patterson, supra.                  
               Mutuality of obligation was present between ATV and Mr.                
          Cutts at all relevant times.  There is no evidence in the record            
          the loans had a definite maturity date or that loans to one party           
          would mature before loans to the other, which suggests the cross-           
          loans were payable in full at any time on demand of either ATV or           
          Mr. Cutts.  See sec. 7872(f)(5); KTA-Tator, Inc. v. Commissioner,           






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