- 19 -
Revenue Code was not intended to limit distraint of delinquent
taxpayer’s goods to those enumerated).
Significantly, courts interpreting statutory language that
utilizes both the word “includes” and the word “means” in
different parts of the same statutory provision have held that
those two words, in the context of such a juxtaposition, have
different interpretations.
Interpreting section 206 of the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27,
44 Stat. 17, the Supreme Court, in Helvering v. Morgan’s Inc.,
293 U.S. 121 (1934), concluded that “includes” and “means” are to
be interpreted differently when both are used in the same
statutory provision. The Supreme Court interpreted the word
“includes” to indicate that what follows contains general
examples (i.e., not an exclusive list) and interpreted the word
“means” to indicate that what follows contains the complete
definition (i.e., an exclusive list).
The natural distinction would be that where “means” is
employed, the term [“means”] and * * * [the language
that follows] are to be interchangeable equivalents,
and that the verb “includes” imports a general class,
some of whose particular instances are those specified
in the * * * [language that follows the term
“includes”]. [Id. at 125, n.1.]
We note that the operative and relevant word used in section
7430(c)(1), relating to litigation costs, is “includes”, while
Page: Previous 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011