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Nor have petitioners articulated with any specificity the
purported economic hardship they will suffer if they are not
allowed to compromise their liability for $100,000. Petitioners
have given us no reason to disagree with the essence of Cochran’s
determination that petitioners’ health does not render them
“incapable of earning a living”, nor have we reason to conclude
that petitioners’ “financial resources will be exhausted
providing for care and support during the course of the
condition”.10 Sec. 301.7122-1 (c)(3)(i)(A), Proced, & Admin.
Regs.
We also are mindful that any decision by Cochran to accept
petitioners’ offer-in-compromise to promote effective tax
administration must be viewed against the backdrop of section
301.7122-1(b)(3)(iii), Proced. & Admin. Regs. That section
requires that Cochran deny petitioners’ offer if her acceptance
of it would undermine voluntary compliance with tax laws by
taxpayers in general. Thus, even if we were to assume arguendo
that petitioners would suffer economic hardship, a finding that
10 We also note that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Fargo v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 706, 710 (9th Cir.
2006), affg. T.C. Memo. 2004-13, dismissed a similar claim of
economic hardship advanced by the taxpayers there. Although
those taxpayers had more assets than petitioners, the court
emphasized that a finding of economic hardship is within the
discretion of Appeals. Under the facts at hand, we find no abuse
of discretion in Cochran’s determination that petitioners would
suffer no economic hardship were they required to pay more than
their $100,000 offer.
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