Searcy M. Ferguson, Jr., and Elizabeth L. Ferguson - Page 6

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               From October 23, 1986, to January 30, 1987, petitioner                 
          executed three deeds of trust, encumbering his community property           
          interest in the Southampton property as security for loans from             
          Union Bank & Trust of Dallas (Union Bank).  On December 17, 1987,           
          Union Bank released the three deeds of trust.  In a letter dated            
          December 18, 1987, Union Bank provided Ms. Smith’s attorney with            
          the following explanation for the release:                                  
               Pursuant to your letter demanding our release of liens                 
               on * * *[the Southampton property], we have consulted                  
               with our attorney and have agreed to release our liens                 
               on the property.  It does appear that the liens were                   
               granted in violation of an injunction at the time, and                 
               since * * *[petitioner] has deeded the property to                     
               * * *[Ms. Smith] as a result of their divorce, our                     
               unrecorded liens are invalid.                                          
               Petitioner ultimately repaid the underlying liability to               
          Union Bank and added as a cause of action in his aforementioned             
          suit against Ms. Smith a claim that Ms. Smith breached the                  
          indemnity provision of the divorce agreement by failing to assume           
          the obligation for the liens on the Southampton property.  As               
          with the conversion claim, the trial court granted Ms. Smith’s              
          motion for summary judgment with respect to the aforementioned              
          breach claim on grounds that petitioner had agreed pursuant to              
          the 1989 settlement agreement not to reopen the divorce case or             
          the divorce agreement.  The court held petitioner to be barred by           
          judgment and estopped by agreement from asserting the                       
          aforementioned breach claim against Ms. Smith.  On appeal, the              
          appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision on grounds that           





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