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“constituted a fraud on the IRS, as found by a civil jury * * *
and by the tax court * * * cannot justify appellants’ own failure
to exercise reasonable care in claiming the losses derived from
their investment”); see also Mortensen v. Commissioner, 440 F.3d
375 (6th Cir. 2006); Van Scoten v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 1243
(10th Cir. 2006); Hansen v. Commissioner, supra. Other than his
vague assertions, petitioner has failed to identify any clear
inconsistencies between respondent’s current position and his
position in any previous litigation. We conclude that there are
no grounds for judicial estoppel in the present case.
3. Fairness Considerations
Petitioner argues that the application of accuracy-related
penalties would be unfair or unjust because such an application
does not comport with the underlying purpose of the penalties.
Petitioner states:
Here, the problem was not Petitioner’s disregard of the
tax laws, but was Jay Hoyt’s fraud and deception.
Petitioner did not engage in noncompliant behavior,
instead, he was the victim of a complex fraud that it
took Respondent years to unravel completely.
Petitioner made a good faith effort to comply with
the tax laws and punishing him by imposing penalties
does not encourage voluntary compliance, but instead
has the opposite effect of the appearance of unfairness
by punishing the victim. Indeed, penalties are
improper for any investor in the Hoyt partnerships on a
policy basis alone. [Fn. ref. omitted.]
We are mindful of the fact that Hoyt was convicted for his
fraudulent actions. We also recognize that petitioner remitted
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