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On the other hand, the focus of Ms. Bader’s argument is that
the Initial Payment was made too early. She argues that the
Initial Payment is not alimony because it was paid prior to the
prescribed date of April 1, 2002. She further argues that Mr. Ray
failed to produce any documentation that would authorize him to
shift the Initial Payment into April, or to deem the Initial
Payment alimony.
The obligation to make alimony payments must have been
imposed by the decree itself. Healey v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
1702, 1705-1706 (1970), affd. without published opinion 28 AFTR 2d
71-5217, 71-2 USTC par. 9536 (4th Cir. 1971); see Prince v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C. 1058 (1976); Joslyn v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.
126, 133-134 (1954) (holding that payments that fell outside of
the scope of a qualified divorce or separation instrument were not
alimony), revd. in part and affd. in part on other grounds 230
F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1956); Leventhal v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2000-92 (same).
The qualifying divorce decree, from which Mr. Ray’s alimony
obligation arose, required alimony payments to commence on April
1, 2002. The Court must decide whether the Initial Payment fell
outside of the scope of the qualifying divorce decree, because it
was made prior to April 1, 2002. The Court holds that it does.
Under section 71(b)(1)(A), the Court has strictly construed
the terms of the instrument in determining whether a payment has
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