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e.g., James v. United States, 970 F.2d 750, 753 n.6 (10th Cir.
1992); United States v. Neff, 954 F.2d 698, 699 (11th Cir. 1992);
Freas v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-552; Andreas v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-551.
Petitioner argues that he is not obligated to pay Federal
income tax because (1) the Internal Revenue Code does not assign
a value to the “exempt amount”, (2) the “exempt amount” appears
in IRS publications and instructions “ex post facto”, and (3) he
is not required “to comply with a law ‘ex post facto’”.
Petitioner’s argument is incomprehensible. If petitioner means
to assert that the taxation of income in excess of the exempt
amount is an ex post facto law in violation of Article I of the
Constitution, that argument has no merit. The constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws applies only to penal
legislation that imposes or increases criminal punishment for
conduct predating its enactment. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 594 (1952). The Ex Post Facto Clause is not applicable
in a civil context. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227,
242 (1912). The Federal income tax imposed under the Internal
Revenue Code is not penal legislation and does not impose or
increase criminal punishment. Accordingly, imposition of Federal
income tax on income in excess of the exempt amount does not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See
Karpa v. Commissioner, 909 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1990) (retroactive
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