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them by the use of particular language, the intentions of the
parties are not controlling.” Id. at 70 (citing Commissioner v.
Lester, 366 U.S. 299, 304-305 (1961)). The Court compared the
QDRO provisions to the child support language in section 71(c) at
issue in Lester, and concluded that “a QDRO should be ‘clear and
specific’ and not ‘left to determination by inference or
conjecture.’” Id. at 73 (quoting Commissioner v. Lester, supra at
306). With these considerations in mind, the Court held that the
DRO was not a QDRO, in part because on its face it did not
create, recognize, or assign rights in the pension plan to Mrs.
Hawkins. Id. at 74. The Court concluded that identifying the
pension plan as the source of the $1 million payable to Mrs.
Hawkins was not a sufficient indication that she was an alternate
payee. Id. The Court noted that there were no clear signs that
a QDRO was intended, such as references to Mrs. Hawkins as the
alternate payee or as the person responsible for the taxes on the
distribution. Id.
Mr. Hawkins appealed the Court’s decision to the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which reversed this Court’s
ruling. Hawkins v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1996),
revg. 102 T.C. 61 (1994). The Court of Appeals held that the use
of the phrase “$1 million ‘from’ * * * [the pension plan]”
sufficiently created or recognized the contractual right in Mrs.
Hawkins required by section 414(p)(1)(A)(i). Id. at 990. The
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