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Commerce and Trade - 15 USC Section 37b
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01/03/05 Sec. 37b. Confirmation of antitrust status of graduate medical
resident matching programs
(a) Findings and purposes
(1) Findings
Congress makes the following findings:
(A) For over 50 years, most United States medical school
seniors and the large majority of graduate medical education
programs (popularly known as "residency programs") have chosen
to use a matching program to match medical students with
residency programs to which they have applied. These matching
programs have been an integral part of an educational system
that has produced the finest physicians and medical researchers
in the world.
(B) Before such matching programs were instituted, medical
students often felt pressure, at an unreasonably early stage of
their medical education, to seek admission to, and accept
offers from, residency programs. As a result, medical students
often made binding commitments before they were in a position
to make an informed decision about a medical specialty or a
residency program and before residency programs could make an
informed assessment of students' qualifications. This situation
was inefficient, chaotic, and unfair and it often led to
placements that did not serve the interests of either medical
students or residency programs.
(C) The original matching program, now operated by the
independent non-profit National Resident Matching Program and
popularly known as "the Match", was developed and implemented
more than 50 years ago in response to widespread student
complaints about the prior process. This Program includes on
its board of directors individuals nominated by medical student
organizations as well as by major medical education and
hospital associations.
(D) The Match uses a computerized mathematical algorithm, as
students had recommended, to analyze the preferences of
students and residency programs and match students with their
highest preferences from among the available positions in
residency programs that listed them. Students thus obtain a
residency position in the most highly ranked program on their
list that has ranked them sufficiently high among its
preferences. Each year, about 85 percent of participating
United States medical students secure a place in one of their
top 3 residency program choices.
(E) Antitrust lawsuits challenging the matching process,
regardless of their merit or lack thereof, have the potential
to undermine this highly efficient, pro-competitive, and
long-standing process. The costs of defending such litigation
would divert the scarce resources of our country's teaching
hospitals and medical schools from their crucial missions of
patient care, physician training, and medical research. In
addition, such costs may lead to abandonment of the matching
process, which has effectively served the interests of medical
students, teaching hospitals, and patients for over half a
century.
(2) Purposes
It is the purpose of this section to -
(A) confirm that the antitrust laws do not prohibit
sponsoring, conducting, or participating in a graduate medical
education residency matching program, or agreeing to do so; and
(B) ensure that those who sponsor, conduct or participate in
such matching programs are not subjected to the burden and
expense of defending against litigation that challenges such
matching programs under the antitrust laws.
(b) Application of antitrust laws to graduate medical education
residency matching programs
(1) Definitions
In this subsection:
(A) Antitrust laws
The term "antitrust laws" -
(i) has the meaning given such term in subsection (a) of
section 12 of this title, except that such term includes
section 45 of this title to the extent such section 45
applies to unfair methods of competition; and
(ii) includes any State law similar to the laws referred to
in clause (i).
(B) Graduate medical education program
The term "graduate medical education program" means -
(i) a residency program for the medical education and
training of individuals following graduation from medical
school;
(ii) a program, known as a specialty or subspecialty
fellowship program, that provides more advanced training; and
(iii) an institution or organization that operates,
sponsors or participates in such a program.
(C) Graduate medical education residency matching program
The term "graduate medical education residency matching
program" means a program (such as those conducted by the
National Resident Matching Program) that, in connection with
the admission of students to graduate medical education
programs, uses an algorithm and matching rules to match
students in accordance with the preferences of students and the
preferences of graduate medical education programs.
(D) Student
The term "student" means any individual who seeks to be
admitted to a graduate medical education program.
(2) Confirmation of antitrust status
It shall not be unlawful under the antitrust laws to sponsor,
conduct, or participate in a graduate medical education residency
matching program, or to agree to sponsor, conduct, or participate
in such a program. Evidence of any of the conduct described in
the preceding sentence shall not be admissible in Federal court
to support any claim or action alleging a violation of the
antitrust laws.
(3) Applicability
Nothing in this section shall be construed to exempt from the
antitrust laws any agreement on the part of 2 or more graduate
medical education programs to fix the amount of the stipend or
other benefits received by students participating in such
programs.
(c) Effective date
This section shall take effect on April 10, 2004, shall apply to
conduct whether it occurs prior to, on, or after April 10, 2004,
and shall apply to all judicial and administrative actions or other
proceedings pending on April 10, 2004.
Last modified: June 14, 2006
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