Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 25 (1992)

Page:   Index   Previous  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  Next

434

DEWSNUP v. TIMM

Scalia, J., dissenting

Ante, at 157, 158. And "the fact that Congress carefully reexamined and entirely rewrote the preference provision in 1978 supports the conclusion that the text of § 547(c)(2) as enacted reflects the deliberate choice of Congress." Ante, at 160. What was true of the preference provision in Wolas is also true of the secured claims provisions at issue in the present case: Congress' careful reexamination and entire rewriting of those provisions supports the conclusion that, regardless of whether pre-Code practice is retained or abandoned, the text means precisely what it says. Indeed, the rewriting here is so complete that, no matter how deeply one admires and venerates "pre-Code law," it is impossible to interpret § 506(d) in a manner that entirely preserves it— and the Court itself, for all its protestation of fealty, does not do so. No provision of the former Bankruptcy Act, nor any pre-Code doctrine, purported to invalidate—across the board—liens securing claims disallowed in bankruptcy, see 11 U. S. C. § 107 (1976 ed.); see also 4 Collier on Bankruptcy

¶ 67 (14th ed. 1978), yet that is precisely what § 506(d), as interpreted by the Court today, accomplishes.

It is even more instructive to compare today's opinion with our decision a few years ago in United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235 (1989), which involved another subsection of § 506 itself. The issue was whether § 506(b) made postpetition interest available even to those oversecured creditors whose liens were nonconsensual. The Court of Appeals had held that it did not, because such a disposition would alter the pre-Code rule and there was no "legislative history" to support the change. We disagreed. The opinion for the Court began "where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself." Id., at 241. We did not recite the contentions of the parties and declare "ambiguity," but entered into our own careful consideration of "[t]he natural reading of the [relevant] phrase," the "grammatical structure of the statute," and the "terminology used throughout the Code." Id., at 241 and 242, n. 5. Hav-

Page:   Index   Previous  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007