Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 19 (1992)

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240

STRINGER v. BLACK

Souter, J., dissenting

ent's sentencing, the Supreme Court of Georgia, in a different case, held that the "substantial history" circumstance left "a wide latitude of discretion in a jury as to whether or not to impose the death penalty," rendering a death sentence imposed upon the strength of the "substantial history" circumstance alone unconstitutional under Furman. Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 541, 224 S. E. 2d 386, 392 (1976). The Supreme Court of Georgia nevertheless refused to vacate Stephens' sentence, holding it adequately supported by the other, unchallenged, aggravating circumstances. Stephens v. State, 237 Ga. 259, 261-262, 227 S. E. 2d 261, 263, cert. denied, 429 U. S. 986 (1976). This Court agreed, holding Godfrey to be distinguishable because, in that case, the single aggravating circumstance failed to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, as required by the Eighth Amendment, 462 U. S., at 878, while in Stephens, the remaining aggravating circumstances properly discharged the narrowing obligation, id., at 879. The vagueness of one among several aggravating circumstances was therefore held to be irrelevant, and the scheme itself adequate under Furman, 462 U. S., at 888-889, so long as it included mandatory appellate review for any arbitrariness or disproportionality stemming from some other source, id., at 890.

The last relevant pre-1985 decision is Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939 (1983). The Florida scheme, like the one in Georgia, requires the sentencer to impose a life sentence if it finds no aggravating circumstances present. But, unlike Georgia, Florida is a weighing State, in which the sentencer who finds that one or more aggravating circumstances exist must determine the sentence by weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In Barclay, a judge had imposed a death sentence after finding several aggravating circumstances, one of which was that the petitioner had a criminal record, id., at 944-945, which Florida law did not recognize as an aggravating circumstance, id., at 946. This Court held that the resulting death sentence did not violate the Eighth

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