Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 21 (1992)

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120

FOUCHA v. LOUISIANA

Thomas, J., dissenting

and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.' " 463 U. S., at 368 (emphasis added) (quoting Jackson, supra, at 738). We then held that "[i]n light of the congressional purposes underlying commitment of insanity acquittees [in the District of Columbia,]" which we identified as treatment of the insanity acquittee's mental illness and protection of the acquittee and society, "petitioner clearly errs in contending that an acquittee's hypothetical maximum sentence provides the constitutional limit for his commitment." 463 U. S., at 368 (emphasis added). Given that the commitment law was reasonably related to Congress' purposes, this Court had no basis for invalidating it as a matter of substantive due process.

It is simply wrong for the Court to assert today that we "held" in Jones that " 'the committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous.' " Ante, at 77 (quoting Jones, 463 U. S., at 368).14

We specifically noted in Jones that no issue regarding the standards for the release of insanity acquittees was before us. Id., at 363, n. 11. The question we were answering in the part of Jones from which the Court quotes was whether it is permissible to hold an insanity acquittee for a period longer than he could have been incarcerated if convicted, not whether it is permissible to hold him once he becomes "sane." As noted above, our substantive due process analysis in Jones was straightforward: Did the means chosen by Congress (commitment of insanity acquittees until

14 If this were really a "holding" of Jones, then I am at a loss to understand Justice O'Connor's assertion that the Court today does not hold "that Louisiana may never confine dangerous insanity acquittees after they regain mental health." Ante, at 87. Either it is true that, as a matter of substantive due process, an insanity acquittee is " 'entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity,' " ante, at 77 (quoting Jones, 463 U. S., at 368), or it is not. The Court apparently cannot make up its mind.

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