OCTOBER TERM, 1991
Syllabus
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit
No. 91-6382. Argued February 25, 1992—Decided June 22, 1992
A Louisiana jury convicted petitioner Sawyer and sentenced him to death for a murder in which the victim was beaten, scalded with boiling water, and set afire. His conviction and sentence were upheld on appeal, and his petitions for state postconviction relief, as well as his first petition for federal habeas relief, were denied. In a second federal habeas petition, the District Court barred as abusive or successive Sawyer's claims, inter alia, that the police failed to produce exculpatory evidence—evidence challenging a prosecution witness' credibility and a child witness' statements that Sawyer had tried to prevent an accomplice from setting fire to the victim—in violation of his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83; and that his trial counsel's failure to introduce mental health records as mitigating evidence in his trial's sentencing phase constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Sawyer had not shown cause for failure to raise his claims in his earlier petition, and that it could not otherwise reach the claims' merits because he had not shown that he was "actually innocent" of the death penalty under Louisiana law.
Held: 1. To show "actual innocence" one must show by clear and convincing evidence that but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state law. Pp. 338-347. (a) Generally, a habeas petitioner must show cause and prejudice before a court will reach the merits of a successive, abusive, or defaulted claim. Even if he cannot meet this standard, a court may hear the merits of such claims if failure to hear them would result in a miscarriage of justice. See, e. g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436. The miscarriage of justice exception applies where a petitioner is "actually innocent" of the crime of which he was convicted or the penalty which was imposed. While it is not easy to define what is meant by "actually innocent" of the death penalty, the exception is very narrow and must be determined by relatively objective standards. Pp. 338-341. (b) In order to avoid arbitrary and capricious impositions of the death sentence, States have adopted narrowing factors to limit the class of offenders upon which the death penalty may be imposed, as evidenced
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