Cite as: 506 U. S. 194 (1993)
Thomas, J., dissenting
One certainly need not search long or far to find examples of the use of "poor" in connection with nonhuman entities—and, indeed, in connection with the very entities listed in 1 U. S. C. § 1. No less a figure than Justice Holmes had occasion to write that the issuance of stock dividends renders a corporation "no poorer" than it was before their distribution, Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, 426 (1918), and other judges have used the word "poor" (or one of its derivatives) in a similar fashion, see, e. g., Ordinetz v. Springfield Family Center, Inc., 142 Vt. 466, 468, 457 A. 2d 282, 283 (1983) ("[A] nonprofit corporation may be . . . wealthy or impoverished"); In re Whitley v. Klauber, 51 N. Y. 2d 555, 579, 416 N. E. 2d 569, 581 (1980) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) ("[T]he corporation is no richer or poorer for the transaction"). More important for our purposes, Congress itself has used the word "poor" to describe entities other than natural persons, referring in at least two provisions of the United States Code to the world's "poorest countries"—a term that is used as a synonym for the least developed of the so-called "developing" countries. See 22 U. S. C. §§ 262p-4f(a)(3), 2151d(d)(4). If Congress has seen fit to describe a country as "poor," I see no reason for concluding that the notion of a "poor" corporation, partnership, or association ought not to be "imputed to Congress." Ante, at 203.7
7 The majority says that we established the "standard of eligibility" for in forma pauperis status in "distinctly human terms," ante, at 203, in Adkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U. S. 331 (1948), and then quotes the following language from our opinion in that case: "We think an affidavit is sufficient which states that one cannot because of his poverty 'pay or give security for the costs . . . and still be able to provide' himself and dependents 'with the necessities of life,' " id., at 339. But the "standard of eligibility" was cast in "distinctly human terms" in Adkins only because the parties seeking in forma pauperis status in that case were natural persons, and the language quoted by the Court was taken from their affidavits. See id., at 334. Thus, contrary to the majority's suggestion, Adkins established no a priori standard of "poverty," and is in no way inconsistent with the view that an artificial entity may be "poor."
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