260
Opinion of the Court
an exception that was codified eventually in Rule 43(b). Because it did " 'not seem to us to be consonant with the dictates of common sense that an accused person, being at large upon bail, should be at liberty, whenever he pleased, to withdraw himself from the courts of his country and to break up a trial already commenced,' " id., at 457, quoting Falk v. United States, 15 App. D. C. 446, 454 (1899), cert. denied, 181 U. S. 618 (1901), the Court held:
"[W]here the offense is not capital and the accused is not in custody, . . . if, after the trial has begun in his presence, he voluntarily absents himself, this does not nullify what has been done or prevent the completion of the trial, but, on the contrary, operates as a waiver of his right to be present and leaves the court free to proceed with the trial in like manner and with like effect as if he were present." 223 U. S., at 455 (emphasis added).
Diaz was cited by the Advisory Committee that drafted Rule 43. The Committee explained: "The second sentence of the rule is a restatement of existing law that, except in capital cases, the defendant may not defeat the proceedings by voluntarily absenting himself after the trial has been commenced in his presence." Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 43, 18 U. S. C. App., p. 821. There is no reason to believe that the drafters intended the Rule to go further. Commenting on a preliminary version of the Rule, Judge John B. Sanborn, a member of the Committee, stated:
"I think it would be inadvisable to conduct criminal trials in the absence of the defendant. That has never been the practice, and, whether the defendant wants to attend the trial or not, I think he should be compelled to be present. If, during the trial, he disappears, there is, of course, no reason why the trial should not proceed without him." 2 M. Wilken & N. Triffin, Drafting His-
Page: Index Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007