Cite as: 511 U. S. 809 (1994)
Scalia, J., dissenting in part
such, these services do not constitute "necessary costs of response" and are not recoverable under CERCLA.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Blackmun and Justice Thomas join, dissenting in part.
I disagree with the Court's conclusion that a private litigant cannot recover the attorney's fees associated with bringing a cost recovery action under § 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U. S. C. § 9607. Under §§ 107(a)(4)(A) and (B), a party who has incurred costs to clean up a hazardous waste site can recover those costs from any other party liable under CERCLA. Those provisions state that:
"Covered persons . . . shall be liable for—
"(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
"(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan." (Emphases added.)
Title 42 U. S. C. § 9601(25) explains that:
"The terms 'respond' or 'response' means [sic] remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action; all such terms (including the terms 'removal' and 'remedial action') include enforcement activities related thereto." (Emphases added; footnote omitted.)
Under the plain language of these provisions, a private litigant is entitled to the costs associated with bringing a § 107(a)(4)(B) cost recovery action, which is the only
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