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Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 7 (1994)

Legal Research Home > United States Supreme Court > 512 U.S. > Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 7 (1994)

458

DAVIS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

The right to counsel recognized in Miranda is sufficiently important to suspects in criminal investigations, we have held, that it "requir[es] the special protection of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S., at 483. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U. S. 1039, 1046- 1047 (1983) (plurality opinion); id., at 1051 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). If the suspect effectively waives his right to counsel after receiving the Miranda warnings, law enforcement officers are free to question him. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U. S. 369, 372-376 (1979). But if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the interview, he is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation. Edwards v. Arizona, supra, at 484-485. This "second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel," McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U. S. 171, 176 (1991), is "designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights," Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U. S. 344, 350 (1990). To that end, we have held that a suspect who has invoked the right to counsel cannot be questioned regarding any offense unless an attorney is actually present. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U. S. 146 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U. S. 675 (1988). "It remains clear, however, that this prohibition on further questioning—like other aspects of Miranda—is not itself required by the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on coerced confessions, but is instead justified only by reference to its prophylactic purpose." Connecticut v. Barrett, supra, at 528.

The applicability of the " 'rigid' prophylactic rule" of Edwards requires courts to "determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel." Smith v. Illinois, supra, at 95 (emphasis added), quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 719 (1979). To avoid difficulties of proof and to

the interpretation of a federal statute on which the Department of Justice expressly declines to take a position. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 44-47.

Last modified: October 4, 2007