Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 20 (1994)

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Cite as: 512 U. S. 504 (1994)

Thomas, J., dissenting

ibid., demonstrates the inaccuracy of the Court's suggestion that the letter addressed topics entirely unrelated to the anti-redistribution principle, ante, at 515-516; the "appropriateness" of allocating costs from a medical school to its affiliated hospital is precisely what the anti-redistribution principle governs, to the extent it has substantive effect at all. See 42 CFR § 413.85(c) (1993).

Moreover, in 1982, the Secretary answered a query from a fiscal intermediary concerning the relationship between the anti-redistribution principle and Intermediary Letter 78-7 with the statement that "allocation of costs to a hospital from a related medical school is governed by Intermediary Letter 78-7." App. 25. The Court makes much of the fact that the 1982 memorandum did not explicitly mention the anti-redistribution principle. Ante, at 516, n. 4. In so doing, however, the Court overlooks the fact that the fiscal intermediary's inquiry presented the Secretary with a specific binary choice: Are approved educational activities previously paid for by an affiliated educational unit either allowable (i. e., reimbursable) hospital costs (as Intermediary Letter No. 78-7 advised) or a prohibited redistribution of costs under § 413.85(c)? By answering the fiscal intermediary's pointed query with the statement that Intermediary Letter No. 78-7 is controlling on the reimbursability of the costs associated with such activities, see App. 25, the Secretary quite clearly (albeit implicitly) afforded the anti-redistribution principle no substantive effect whatsoever.

To be sure, in 1985 the Secretary issued a memorandum stating, without elaboration, that "[t]he fact that [the anti-redistribution principle] is not mentioned in the [1982] memorandum does not change the basic policy as espoused in [§ 413.85(c)]." Id., at 27. The 1985 memorandum's bare reference to the "policy" of § 413.85(c), however, neither disa-vowed the Secretary's past interpretation of the regulation nor set forth any alternative interpretation. The Court thus considerably overstates matters in its suggestion that

523

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