38
Opinion of the Court
ity's operating and capital expenses. Further, even the limited administrative expense payments for which the States provided are contingent on the advance approval of both Governors, see ibid., and the States' treasuries may not be tapped until both legislatures have appropriated the necessary funds. See N. J. Stat. Ann. § 32:1-18 (West 1990); N. Y. Unconsol. Law § 6418 (McKinney 1979). A judgment against PATH, it is thus apparent, would not be enforceable against either New York or New Jersey.
C
The Third Circuit's assessment of PATH's qualification for Eleventh Amendment immunity conflicts with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on the same matter. See Feeney v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 873 F. 2d 628, 631 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, 495 U. S. 299 (1990). The Second Circuit concluded:
"No provision [of the compact or of state legislation pursuant to the compact] commits the treasuries of the two states to satisfy judgments against the Port Authority . . . . We believe that this insulation of state treasuries from the liabilities of the Port Authority outweighs both the methods of appointment and gubernatorial veto so far as the Eleventh Amendment immunity is concerned." 873 F. 2d, at 631.
We affirmed the Second Circuit's judgment in Feeney, but we bypassed the question whether PATH enjoyed the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U. S. 299 (1990). Assuming, arguendo, that the suit in Feeney was tantamount to a claim against the States,8 we ruled that New York and New
8 Our assumption was in accord with prior state and federal decisions typing the Port Authority a state arm or agency. See, e. g., Howell v. Port of New York Authority, 34 F. Supp. 797, 801 (NJ 1940); Trippe v. Port of New York Authority, 14 N. Y. 2d 119, 123, 198 N. E. 2d 585, 586
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